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Frey: Response 
animal cases are seen as remarkably alike in the role 
that experiences and experiences unfolding in a life play. Reply:
What the animal case has to contend with, so far as 
normal adult humans are concerned, is the extent, 
variety, quality, and depth of experiences that are 
available to humans through the multiple dimensions 
of our lives, some of which are made available to us 
through the exercise of our autonomy. Nothing in all 
this says that human lives are more valuable than animal 
lives because they are autonomous lives; all autonomy 
does, at best, is to make ranges of experiences available 
to humans. Even without autonomy, animal lives are 
valuable, since animals remain experiential creatures, 
but without autonomy, human lives are not as valuable 
as they can be, since the full range of the experiences 
such lives are capable of through the additional 
capacities that normal adult human lives typically 
possess is not present. 
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The best-laid schemes 0' mice an' men 
Gang aft aglay, 
An' lea'e us naught but grief an' pain, 
For promised joy!" 
Robert Burns} 
Philosophers have cited autonomy as the reason for 
thinking that the lives ofnonnal adult humans are more 
valuable than the lives of nonhuman animals. In 
"Autonomy and the Orthodoxy of Human Superiority" 
(hereafter, "Orthodoxy"), I questioned what value 
autonomy adds to a life: are our lives better off because 
we are autonomous and therefore have the ability to 
pursue what we think of as the "good life"? Ifwe take an 
external perspective, the answer is plausibly negative: 
because ofour pursuits of what we think is a "good life," 
we have committed genocide, created nuclear weapons, 
caused numerous extinctions, and wrecked havoc on the 
earth's ecosystem. But if we take an inner perspective, it 
seems plausible that an ability to choose our own idea of 
the good life and mold our life to accommodate that idea 
adds positive value to that life. 
This value might be added in one of two ways. It 
could be that our lives are inherently more valuable 
because of these capacities or that our lives are more 
valuable because of the instrumental value of these 
capacities. R. G. Frey holds the instrumental position, 
claiming that the exercise of autonomy enriches a life, 
causing "considerable satisfaction." In investigating 
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Frey's position in "Orthodoxy," I asked: Do the 
autonomous experience more satisfaction than those 
who lack autonomy? This question, critical for Frey's 
position, focuses only on instrumental values and clearly 
does not presuppose a hedonistic account. In answering 
this question, I argued that exercising the capacities of 
judging, choosing ends, and pursuing attainments 
diminishes the satisfactoriness of our lives. 
My argument rested on three points. The ftrst is 
nicely summarized in the above quote from Robert 
Bums: to pursue avidly what one wants and to try to 
mold one's life after some plan not only meets with 
many disappointments, but even when there is success, 
the loss of whatever we attain is typically inevitable. 
The second point is equally straightforward: pursuing 
ambitions and goals typically takes our attention away 
from what is happening in the moment, and so 
diminishes the satisfactoriness of the very lives we are 
experiencing. The third point is also verifted by our 
own experiences: when we begin assessing how to mold 
our lives, contrasting how our lives are with a 
conception of how we think our lives should be, we 
become judgmental. Judgmentalness can and does 
diminish the satisfactoriness of what would otherwise 
be fully and completely satisfying. 
Frey offers ftve responses to my argument and its 
conclusion. His ftrst objection is that my argument is 
couched in terms that are so general that it is not easy 
to see that anything of significance follows. Frey's 
comment about generality is utterly baffling, since our 
discussion, including Frey's claims and criticisms, is at 
the same level of generality. As for Frey's claim about 
a lack of signiftcance, if the points I made are accurate, 
they undermine his view that the exercise of autonomy 
leads to overall satisfaction in a life. 
Frey's second point is equally baffling. He claims 
that my three points "amount to claims about what 
might happen, in the absence of any explanation, 
particularly any causal explanation, of why they will 
happen." My argument rests on much more than what 
"might happen." The relationship between pursuit, 
judgmentalness, distraction, and a diminishment of 
satisfaction are part of the very fabric of human life. 
Many of us will lose much of what we consider to be 
"ours"--parents, home, friends, loved ones, health--well 
before we die. Furthermore, what we have not lost prior 
to our deaths, we typically experience as losses as we 
die.2 I am sure that Frey and I each live in the same 
world in which this reflection is absolutely true, and 
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this reflection is part of what undermines Frey's 
attempted defense of the "considerable satisfaction" 
added to human .life by autonomy. There is nothing 
unexplained here, unless one expects an explanation at 
a very different level--much as the tobacco companies 
continue to claim that it has not been proven that 
smoking causes cancer because a molecular mechanism 
has not yet been discovered. 
Frey's third response is a defense of his view against 
the observation that judgmentalness undermines the 
satisfactoriness of life. Although judgmentalness "may 
indeed lead me to become dissatisfied with the way I 
am living my life at present and so may result in my 
not getting out of my present way of living all that it 
has to offer," he tells us that "there is no necessity about 
this." Ofcourse, I agree. We are not investigating causal 
connections that have the quality of "inevitability," 
"certainty," or "necessity." But a lack of necessity does 
not show a lack oflikelihood, given human nature. The 
story ofTanzan and Ekido walking down a muddy road 
illustrates the way judgmentalness undermines the 
satisfactoriness of everyday experiences. 
Frey's fourth response is an attempt to mute the force 
of my claim that we are more satisfied when we live 
spontaneously and in the moment. He claims that 
all Gruzalski's point comes to is the caution 
that we can become too pre-occupied with 
an organized life and a job or profession and 
so fail to capture in our lives many of the 
good things that life has to offer. But this 
caution is already widely heeded: no one is a 
schoolteacher or pilot twenty-four hours a day, 
and it is easily possible in one's other time to 
experience all ... from good meals and the 
enjoyment of nature to reading .... 
Frey's answer to the diminishment of satisfaction 
through preoccupation, judgmentalness, and distraction 
is that we adopt a hybrid approach: a proper balance of 
absorption in preoccupations with periods set aside for 
smelling the flowers. Frey is certainly correct that a 
goal-directed life is more fulftlling if one puts into it 
moments of awareness of flowers, birdsongs, and 
sunsets. But if the hybrid is better than a life totally 
filled with pursuit and absorbed judgmentalness, then 
a life that excluded these satisfaction-minimizing 
mental activities would plausibly be even better, unless 
we had some reason for believing that a life of 
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moment-to-moment awareness would be more 
satisfactory if we injected into it judgmentalness, 
distraction, and pursuit. We have no such reason. 
Instead, Frey's offer of a hybrid is his way of 
acknowledging how pursuing and judging can 
undermine the satisfactoriness of a life. 
This brings us to Frey's final objection: 
There are neurosurgeons, librarians, athletes, 
and pianists; how exactly are they to live 
spontaneously? Does this injunction mean that 
these individuals must not have professions 
in the frrst place? But then how are they to live? 
And what kind of society... when professions 
and other ways of organizing our lives are put 
aside in favor of spontaneous living? 
This question opens the way for us to become clear on 
two key issues: whether people can act spontaneously 
and what all this tells us about the comparative value 
of human and nonhuman animal lives. 
Can a person spontaneously perform ordinary, 
coherent human activities? The most succinct answer 
to this question requires that we recall what's at issue. 
The relevant comparison is between how we are when 
we cook, or make chairs, or give lectures, and how 
we are when we become cooks, or become carpenters, 
or become prOfessors. When we try to become 
anything, we likely will have standards, values and 
ambitions and might aim our activities and shape our 
lives in accord with them. And we all know exactly 
the difference: between just doing an activity versus 
trying to do it or trying to become something. The 
best athlete, the best surgeon, the best dancer, the best 
cook, the best lover, when each is doing what he or 
she does best, does so without employing those 
capacities that make us stumble and be distracted. As 
W. Timothy Gallwey writes of what he takes to be the 
ideal way a person should play tennis, it involves "the 
kind of spontaneous performance which occurs only 
when the mind is calm and seems at one with the 
body.,,3 These observations point out that by "living 
spontaneously" we do not mean anything exotic or 
beyond the experience of any of us, but are only 
pointing to how we can be when we are not judging, 
pursuing attainments, thinking about how life should 
be, or trying to become something.4 
Recalling what is at issue invites us to return to our 
original comparison between the value ofa life in which 
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sentient beings make choices and perfonn coherent sets 
of actions, inclUding raising young, gathering food, and 
playing, versus a life in which beings mentally posit 
goals, judge the adequacy of what is present, and then 
try to pursue what is not. We humans are able to 
experience life in either of these ways, and these 
experiences provide us with a reliable perspective for a 
comparison between the value of the lives of the 
autonomous and the value of the lives of the nonauton-
omous. Given this perspective, we are not "imagining" 
what it would be like to be a mouse, an eagle, an 
elephant, or how much we enrich the life of a dog by 
playing fetch; instead, we are comparing how we are 
when we are self-consciously judging and pursuing, 
with how we are when we are acting spontaneously 
and attending to what is in the present. From this 
comparison we can extrapolate to what our lives would 
be like overall without self-consciousness, judg-
mentalness, and a pursuit mentality. The result is a 
comparison which is at least partly grounded in 
experience and is not freely floating in the less reliable 
realm of imagination. This comparison shows that the 
exercise of judgmentalness and pursuit much more 
plausibly lessens the overall satisfactoriness ofa human 
life. If we then assume, with Frey, that the value of the 
autonomous life is a function of satisfactoriness, it follows 
that the lives of the autonomous are less valuable than 
the lives of sentient beings without autonomy. 
This is a profoundly unorthodox conclusion. We are 
questioning a central orthodoxy: is there any justi-
fication for believing that the life of a normal adult 
human being, because of the exercise of autonomy, is 
richer, and therefore more valuable, than the life of a 
nonhuman animal? As a society, we live out a version 
of this orthodoxy: we sell mouse traps and rat poisons, 
eat meat, wear leather, allow hunting for sport, and kill 
nonhuman animals not only in research facilities but 
also in high school classrooms. These values are part 
and parcel with the values we apply in medical ethics 
and constitute the orthodoxy we are questioning. Frey, 
surprisingly, claims that "one of the strengths of my 
position on the value of human and anirnallife, I believe, 
is that it coheres nicely with recent discussions of the 
value of life in medical ethics and allied areas." But 
citing practices that assume the orthodoxy is only to 
cite what is in question, and so begs the question. 
The orthodoxy is compelling. We are easily cajoled 
into agreement when we hear rhetoric to the effect 
that, by molding and shaping our lives in the pursuit 
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of what we think of as the good life, we enrich our 
lives, and this enrichment leads to considerable overall 
satisfaction. This rhetoric reflects the cultural bias of 
those who enjoy middle-class luxuries and oppor-
tunities. How does Frey's notion of "richness" apply to 
human beings who are poor, or who live traditional, 
indigenous lifestyles? Frey tells us that "we have an 
idea of what it is to live a rich, full life, of what it is to 
have a life that develops and stretches our talents in 
ways which indicate the full dimensions of what human 
life can be." But how culturally biased is this idea that 
"we" allegedly share? Is the life of a Sinkyone Native 
American living in the area of Northern California a 
thousand years ago as rich, according to Frey's notion 
of richness, as the life of an Oxford don? Would Frey 
say that a Sinkyone woman could stretch her talents to 
their full dimensions as she lived out a hunter-gatherer 
lifestyle that relied primarily on acorns, roots, and fish? 
Is the life of this woman, who knows nothing of reading 
or writing, who traditionally would not travel over 100 
miles from her birthplace, and who lives as the Sinkyone 
people had lived for centuries, as rich, on Frey's account, 
as the life of an Oxford don? Frey provides us a partial 
answer to this question in his discussion of what we 
would make a point about when we say of a woman 
that she has "tasted life to the full": 
We refer to the different dimensions of our 
being and to the woman's attempt to develop 
these in herself and to actualize them in the 
course of her daily life. And an important 
aspect in all this is what agency means to the 
woman: in the sense intended, she is not 
condemned to live the life that all of her 
ancestors have lived; she can mold and shape 
her life to "fit" her own conception of how 
she should live, thereby enabling her to add 
further dimensions of value for her life.5 
Since in traditional indigenous life one lives the life of 
one's ancestors, the implication of Frey's quote is a 
devaluation of the life of women (and men by 
implication) in traditional indigenous communities. But 
Frey offers no argument in favor of this devaluation, 
only an unfounded (and indefensible) rhetoric to 
celebrate a peculiar kind of human life that enjoys 
sufficient wealth to provide the leisure and opportunity 
to lead a life of one's own choosing. However familiar 
and mesmerizing, the rhetoric that reflects our biases 
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for such a life provides no justification for claims about 
either its satisfactoriness or its value. 
Instead, when we examine this rhetoric, we discover 
a straightforward argument that leads to the conclusion 
that exercising the capacities to judge, mold, pursue 
and attain diminishes the overall satisfactoriness of our 
lives. These arguments, I pointed out, are supported by 
the poetic, religious, and philosophical reflections of 
ancients and modems, both East and West. Frey tries to 
discount this supportive material, material that speaks 
to our hearts as well as to our intellects, by claiming 
that my arguments rested on adopting one of these 
many frameworks. My argument does not rely on 
accepting any particular religious framework, 
historical perspective, or cultural outlook. Rather, by 
invoking several, I was pointing out the universality of 
the points I was making about pursuits,judgmentalness, 
and, therefore, autonomy. Unlike Frey's litany of a 
narrow range of orthodoxies to support a covering 
orthodoxy within the same tradition, my use of a variety 
of religious, poetic, and philosophical frameworks 
shows that the view for which I have argued is not 
merely part of one tradition, but is found East and West, 
among ancients and modems. It is, I believe, true of all 
people at all times. 
Nothing I have argued assumes the incommen-
surability of the values of human and nonhuman lives. 
Like Frey, I believe we can talk meaningfully about 
these comparative evaluations. Humans and nonhumans 
share much in common that adds value to our lives: 
contentedness, fear, stress, pleasures and pains, 
companionship, sexuality, grief, teaching offspring, and 
much more constitute our shared experiences. What is 
at stake here is the contribution ofautonomy to the value 
of a life. In "Orthodoxy" I argued that it is plausible to 
think that autonomy diminishes the quality and the 
fullness of the lives we lead. In this response I have 
defended my argument that the instrumental value of 
the exercise of autonomy is a diminishment of the 
satisfactoriness of our lives, for reasons partially and 
beautifully summarized in the final stanza of Robert 
Bums' poem "To A Mouse": 
Still thou are blest, compared wi' me! 
The present only toucheth thee: 
But och! I backward cast my e'e, 
On prospects dread! 
An' forward, though I cmma see, 
I guess an' fear. 6 
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To think that the capacities Frey collects under the 
notion of autonomy, the capacities of judging and 
pursuing what we think of as the good life, cause our Concerned about: 
lives to be more satisfactory and, therefore, more 
valuable than the lives of nonhuman animals, is an 
Furs?unjustifiable myth. To use this myth to discount and 
marginalize the lives of our brother and sister animals 
Zoos?is a real tragedy, for them as well as for us. 
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England II ed. Anderson and Buckley (Glenview, Illinois: Vivisection?Scott, Foresman and Co., 1968), pp. 118-119. 
2This is typically part of the dying experience. Ofcourse, Factory Farming? 
there are modes of dying-massive and "instantaneous"-in 
which this experience might not occur. But even in automobile Wildlife Conservation? 
and other "quick" threats to living, those who recover not 
infrequently report adequate psychological time for insights, 
recollections, and the experience of loss. WEARE TOO.... 
3 W. Timothy Gallwey, The Inner Game of Tennis (New 
York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. ii. Did you know that philosophers have also made 
4 Although we know what moments like this are like, a contribution to the growth of the animal 
the question arises whether an entire day, week, or the rest liberation movement?-Think of Clark, Magel, 
of a life could be lived in this way. This is an interesting 
Regan, Rollin, Singer and Sapontzis. question but one tangential to our main issue. I have argued 
elsewhere for the possibility that an entire life could exhibit 
the spontaneity most of us only experience upon occasion. Between the Species "is the only publication 
See my "The Possibility of Nonattachment," Buddhism And which allows such extensive examination of the 
The Emerging World Civilization, ed. Ramakrishna philosophical basis for animal rights."- Brad 
Puligandla and David L. Miller (Carbondale, Illinois: 
Miller, Humane Farming Association. Southern Illinois University Press, 1996), pp. 3-14. Given 
that the instrumental value of the exercise of autonomy is 
overall negative (a diminishment of the satisfactoriness of Subscribe today-and please send your tax 
our lives), then we are either tragically flawed or caught in deductible contribution-help us guarantee 
a tragic drama in which we are both victim and accomplice. philosphers a forum in which to continue toIt is ironic that it is this tragic character of our lives that 
Frey has claimed makes our lives more valuable than the evolve a sound basis for animal rights. 
lives of nonhuman animals. 
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